Short answer: In three 2025 snow and ice cases, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a landlord that had handed control of its building to a tenant owed no duty to a woman who slipped on its icy sidewalk, and that a snow pile with a clear path around it was open and obvious as a matter of law. In a third case, involving a public sidewalk next to a home, the court agreed that a city snow-removal ordinance created no duty enforceable in a lawsuit, but reversed because the trial court relied partly on an argument the injured woman never got to answer.
These decisions show that two questions can end a snow or ice case before trial: who controlled the spot where you fell, and whether the hazard was obvious and avoidable. For the basics of what you must prove, see our guide to slip and fall claims in Utah.
Compagni v. Klemesrud: A Public Sidewalk Next to a Home
Kimberly Compagni slipped on snow and ice on a public sidewalk bordering Bradley Klemesrud’s property, severely injuring her leg, and sued him for negligence (¶¶ 1–2). He sought summary judgment, arguing the snow and ice were an “open and obvious danger” (¶ 2). She relied on a Millcreek ordinance requiring the “owner, occupant, lessor or agent” of property next to a paved sidewalk to clear snow within twelve hours after it stops falling (¶ 3). In his reply memorandum, he argued for the first time that he “neither controlled nor possessed” the sidewalk and had no common-law duty (¶ 4). The trial court agreed, found the ordinance implied no private right of action, and granted summary judgment, saying a factual question on open and obvious did not matter (¶ 5).
The ordinance. The Court of Appeals agreed that the ordinance did not create a duty Compagni could enforce in a civil lawsuit (¶ 17). Its stated purpose is “to better protect the safety of pedestrians,” but it is enforced as a class B misdemeanor, not through a private lawsuit (¶ 12).
The common-law duty. The court reversed on this issue “for procedural rather than substantive reasons” (¶ 13). A reply memorandum “must be limited to rebuttal of new matters raised in the memorandum opposing the motion,” and Compagni had no chance to respond (¶¶ 15–16). The court said the trial court “may ultimately be right on this point,” citing other states’ authority (¶ 15 & n.4), but reversed “without deciding its merits” (¶ 17).
The decision is Compagni v. Klemesrud, 2025 UT App 71, filed May 15, 2025.
Andrews v. Stoney Brook: A Snow Pile With a Clear Path Around It
Kathie Andrews visited a friend at a condominium complex on a February evening (¶ 3). That morning, resident William Thomason had brushed snow off his car onto a just-cleared sidewalk. Surveillance images showed the snow covered only part of the sidewalk; an expert found the clear corridor was at least one foot wide (¶ 4). About eight hours later, Andrews walked from her car looking toward the building rather than at her feet, stepped onto the pile, and broke her wrist. She acknowledged she “saw the snow” and that nothing prevented her from using the clear part (¶¶ 5, 24). The trial court granted summary judgment to the condominium association and Thomason on all claims (¶ 10).
The open-and-obvious rule. A possessor of land generally is not liable to invitees for a danger that is “known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness” (¶ 16). Its two steps (was the danger obvious, and should harm still have been anticipated) “present factual questions that will usually require a factfinder’s attention” (¶¶ 17–18).
Here, the pile was open and obvious as a matter of law, given the photographs, her testimony, and an earlier fall she had in icy conditions (¶ 24). With “an obvious corridor of cleared and snow-free concrete” around it and nothing specific distracting her, the association could not reasonably have anticipated she would walk onto it (¶ 25). The court contrasted Zazzetti v. Prestige Senior Living Center, 2022 UT App 42, where the evidence showed the entire sidewalk was icy and the only way into the building (¶¶ 22, 27).
Who can be sued, and for what. Thomason, “a mere resident of the complex and member of the condominium association,” was not shown to possess the common areas (¶ 30). On a question not yet “squarely decided in Utah,” the court held that the open-and-obvious rule can defeat a general negligence claim “but only if the negligence complained of concerns a dangerous condition on land,” not a defendant’s “active negligence” (¶¶ 35, 40). Thomason’s brushing did not directly cause the fall; the pile had become “a then-stagnant condition on the land” (¶ 46). The court affirmed (¶ 50).
The decision is Andrews v. Stoney Brook Condominium Ass’n, 2025 UT App 126, filed August 21, 2025.
Peragallo v. W&T Holdings: A Landlord That Handed Over Control
W&T Holdings leased its Smithfield building and parking lot to Paragon Medical. The lease gave Paragon quiet enjoyment, made it responsible for maintaining “all portions of the Premises,” and let W&T enter only “with at least one day’s prior notice” (¶¶ 2–5). W&T said this covered snow and ice removal, which Paragon had been doing (¶ 6). In January 2018, Bonnie Peragallo, assigned by her employer to work in the building for Paragon, slipped on ice on the sidewalk (¶ 7). She sued only W&T, and the trial court granted summary judgment (¶¶ 1, 8).
The duty belongs to the possessor. Affirming, the court explained that the duty to invitees falls on “possessors, not landowners,” and control is “the hallmark of possessor status” (¶ 12). Paragon had the exclusive right to occupy the premises, including the sidewalks, and the responsibility and authority for maintenance, including snow removal (¶¶ 17–18). W&T’s notice requirement could keep it from handling conditions “that emerge and present a risk in less than one day (like ice)” (¶ 19), and its backup maintenance right was not the substantial control a possessor needs (¶¶ 21–22). “Being a landowner is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a possessor of land” (¶ 25).
The decision is Peragallo v. W&T Holdings, 2025 UT App 77, filed May 22, 2025.
What the Three Cases Mean Together
Start with control, not ownership. In Peragallo, the owner was not the possessor. In Andrews, a resident was not shown to possess the common areas. In Compagni, the Court of Appeals did not decide whether a homeowner has a common-law duty to clear the public sidewalk next door, but said the trial court, which found none, “may ultimately be right” (¶¶ 14–15). And a snow-removal ordinance enforced as a misdemeanor did not create a duty the injured pedestrian could enforce in a lawsuit (¶ 12).
Open and obvious depends on the details. The rule applied as a matter of law in Andrews because the pile was obvious and there was an easy way around it (¶ 28). Where people are “essentially required to be” near a hazard, such as the only walkway into a building, a factfinder may need to decide whether harm should have been anticipated (¶ 27). Because the rule goes to duty, when it applies the possessor “cannot be held liable” (¶ 16), which is different from comparing each side’s share of fault; see recovering when you were partly at fault.
Creating the hazard is not always enough. Under Andrews, someone who created a snow pile can still rely on the rule when the injury came from the condition itself, not active negligence (¶¶ 40, 46).
Limits of These Decisions
- Compagni left the key questions open. The court did not decide whether a neighboring owner has a common-law duty to clear a public sidewalk, or whether the snow and ice were open and obvious (¶ 17). The opinion does not say how the case ended. Its ordinance ruling addressed Millcreek’s wording and penalty (¶ 12); other cities’ ordinances may differ.
- Andrews turned on undisputed facts. The court stressed the rule’s “fact-bound and case-specific” nature and assumed, for its analysis, that Andrews was an invitee (¶ 14 n.2, ¶ 16 n.3). It also said Andrews “has a point” that the rule may fit better under breach than duty, but it was bound by Utah Supreme Court precedent (¶ 16 n.3).
- Peragallo turned on the lease. A lease leaving the landlord more control could call for a different analysis (¶ 22), and a landlord can owe a duty for areas it keeps control of, “such as common areas” (¶ 27). The opinion does not address any claim against the tenant.
- No government defendants. None of the three addressed a claim against a city or other government entity.
Practical Takeaways
- Identify who controlled the exact spot: a tenant, landlord, HOA or condo association, property manager, or snow-removal company. Ask early for the lease, association documents, and any snow-removal contract.
- Photograph the scene as soon as you safely can: the full walkway, any clear path, the lighting, and the surface. In Andrews, the court called the photographic evidence “quite compelling” (¶ 24). Ask about camera footage quickly.
- Write down when snow stopped, when the area was last cleared, whether anyone shoveled afterward, and why you took your route. Whether there was a reasonable way around mattered in Andrews (¶¶ 27–28).
- Check local snow-removal ordinances, but do not assume a violation gives you a claim.
- If a government entity may be responsible, a claim is barred unless a notice of claim is filed within one year after the claim arises (Utah Code § 63G-7-402). Review Utah’s injury deadlines and act early.
Talk to a Utah Injury Attorney
If you slipped on snow or ice in Utah, we can help identify who controlled the property, gather lease and maintenance records, and explain your options in plain terms.
Hurt in Utah? Call (801) 921-5134 or send us your case for a free consultation. No attorney fees unless we win. Hablamos Español.

